Sandra Day O’Connor and Henry Kissinger recently died only a few days apart. I glanced at some of the obits, memorials, and reminiscences about them. There was a striking difference. Nary a bad word was said about O’Connor. Not so for Kissinger. We were reminded of some of his positive accomplishments, but many comments dwelled on what were seen as immoral decisions leading to the deaths of tens of thousands and brutal dictatorial actions. Much of this commentary was summarized in a political cartoon that had Kissinger on escalator descending into hell. I thought of Jackie “Moms” Mabley’s take on the well-worn adage: “They say you shouldn’t say anything about the dead unless it’s good. He’s dead. Good.”

I first became aware of Kissinger when in a college political science course in 1965 I was assigned to read Kissinger’s book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. In certain (but small) circles it had garnered much attention. In the book, Kissinger criticized President Eisenhower’s stated policy of massive retaliation if the United States were to be attacked. The theory was that one party would not attack if it knew that the response would assure the destruction of both sides. Later this policy became known as mutually assured destruction whose acronym indicates how easy it was to mock the Strangelovian doctrine of massive retaliation. Even so, Kissinger was one of the first to criticize it openly.

The book, however, did not just criticize massive retaliation. It also promoted the use of nuclear weapons. Kissinger did not want the United States to eschew their use, but to employ tactical nuclear weapons in our conflicts. I did not know then, and am not sure now, what a “tactical” nuclear weapon is, but I thought even in my college days that their use would lead to widespread noncombatant deaths. That apparently was ok with Kissinger if the US was engaged in some righteous cause, but he did not define, at least to my satisfaction, his notion of righteousness. I had the feeling that he might mean that the US never did inappropriate things, and therefore America would always be justified in the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

I didn’t think much of Kissinger one way or the other after reading the book until he obtained nationwide recognition when he was appointed National Security Advisor by President Richard Nixon in 1969. A friend of mine, however, met Kissinger before he took federal office. The friend was working for the first hedge fund created by Alfred Winslow Jones. Someone trying to obtain some of the fund’s investment money came to the offices with Kissinger in tow. Kissinger then held an academic position at Harvard, but he was also happy to make additional money by advising rich and powerful businessmen. (Later in life he had a consulting firm. He did more than ok in these ventures. Several sources report that he was worth $50 million when he died.)

Kissinger addressed this hedge fund in early 1968 when the country was bogged down with the war in Vietnam. Kissinger confidently said that the war was unwinnable. After Kissinger concluded his remarks, my friend asked, “If this is apparent to you, surely it must be to the advisors to the President.” Kissinger replied, “I am sure it is, but the President can always choose who he listens to.”

A year later, Dr. Henry Kissinger was National Security Advisor to the newly elected President Richard Nixon. Kissinger, at least from what he had said to my friend a year earlier, was convinced the war could not be won. So, America’s involvement in Vietnam ended once Nixon and Kissinger got power. Of course, not. The United States did not withdraw its troops until 1975, and from the time Nixon took office until that messy, embarrassing withdrawal, another 20,000 Americans were killed in Vietnam. Furthermore, Nixon and Kissinger escalated the war by bombing Cambodia and increasing the unacknowledged bombing of Laos. (See the post on this blog, “Bombs Away” on April 24, 2017.) Hundreds of thousands, maybe millions, of Southeast Asians died because of the war after Nixon and Kissinger ascended to power. (No accurate count of Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian deaths exist, but by one estimate three million Vietnamese died in the war, two million of whom were civilians.)

Perhaps, even though Kissinger had previously said the war was unwinnable, instead of helping end it, he supported its escalation because he had an honest conversion. Somehow, perhaps, he became convinced that although the extensive bombings in Vietnam had not worked, more extensive, more brutal bombings would bring the enemy to the bargaining table. That Kissinger ever thought that is hard to believe. That kind of fantasy hardly fits with Kissinger’s realpolitik mystique.

Instead, as discussed on Harry Shearer’s fascinating radio program Le Show (This was the fortieth anniversary of Le Show. Who knew?), the White House tapes of conversations between Nixon and Kissinger show that the continuation of the war was strictly politics. The war could not be won, but Nixon and Kissinger did not want to be blamed for losing the war, at least not before 1972 when Nixon desperately planned to be reelected. The war had to be maintained for at least four years after Nixon and Kissinger took office. And, consequently, many, many had to die to ensure Nixon would remain in office.