The Words Fail (concluded)

Although I was a criminal defense attorney, that work included no child pornography cases. My first personal involvement with a child pornography charge came in my teaching career when a colleague–I will call him Fred–was arrested for having pornographic images of children on his work computer. Subsequently, many more such images were found on his home computer.

These events led to many reports in all sorts of media including on Fox’s O’Reilly show before charges of sexual harassment led to a change in Bill’s career path. (I was invited to enter that “no-spin zone” to discuss Fred’s situation. I declined.) In media accounts, Fred was invariably described as a “child pornographer,” and I began to think about what that label conveyed. What does the term elicit for you?

Fred, in fact, was in a long-term, successful marriage. He had two daughters doing well in elite schools. They described him as a loving, supportive father. He had a successful academic career. He had never sought out any untoward contact with any children. Neither colleagues nor students had ever indicated anything wrong with his behavior (other than that he could be boring.) He did look at images that most of us would find disgusting and that a psychologist did say indicated an arrested sexuality, but if so, no one could find any harm from it in his personal or professional life.

And when you hear someone is a child pornographer, what activities do you think that person has engaged in? Someone procures the children. Someone puts them into a sexual situation. Sometimes that may involve two similarly aged children, but it may also be an adult or older child raping or otherwise sexually abusing a child. Someone arranges the location of the activities. Someone takes pictures of the abuse. If it is internet porn, someone uploads images, perhaps to a website monitored by another person. If there are payments for others to view or download the images, someone operates a system to transfer funds.  Then someone views and often downloads the images. That person might keep this activity private or share images with others.

Fred was the last person in this chain. He had learned ways to download these images without payment, but he did not share the pictures with anyone. (He freely talked with the police when arrested. They were very interested in how such images could be viewed or downloaded without paying. Fred showed them how.) Every so often he looked at some of them; too many had been downloaded for all of them to ever have been viewed. It was his dirty, guilty secret; it was his addiction and sickness which had afflicted him from childhood.

I learned from Fred and from subsequent exposure to similar cases from public defenders that the downloaders–like Fred–were labeled “child pornographers.”  But I have also seen that in the all-too-rare circumstances when those who create or distribute the images are arrested, they, too, were called “child pornographers.” We don’t have separate terms for the different activities. It is as if the international drug smuggler, the meth manufacturer, the local drug seller, the doctor over-prescribing opioids, and the drug addict were all just labeled drug offenders without any distinctions.

The Senate “conservatives” who were trying to suggest that Jackson was soft on child pornography lumped this entire network of child pornographers into one category. If, however, a sentencing judge makes distinctions among the offenses and the offenders as she ought to do–and naturally would do for drug offenses–some of the sentencing would appear wrong to the simple-minded Senators.

Of course, the Senatorial simple mindedness may have been calculated merely to tar Jackson, but their motivations may have been even worse. A few years ago, it might have seemed unlikely that members of the august Senate would pander to QAnon conspiracists, who see child pornographers and sex traffickers around every pizza parlor. Now, however, “conservative” politicians do, and whether intentionally or not, the suggestion that the Supreme Court nominee favors pedophiles feeds the Q crazies.

Even if their questions were well-intentioned, the exchanges were still discouraging because they showed basic flaws in reasoning and revealed a frightening authoritarian streak. That Jackson gave “light” sentences to some has little meaning without comparisons. How often did she give “heavy” sentences to others convicted of pornography crimes? And what about the “control” group? How often have other judges given supposedly light sentences for child pornography? If many in the judiciary have done as much, this could indicate that there is something wrong with the sentencing laws covering these offenses. This should compel a congressional consideration of whether these laws can be made better, more nuanced. But, of course, while today’s Congress may revel in and seek to create gotcha moments, they seldom show much interest in making our laws better.

Finally, some Senators maintained the sentences were inappropriate because they were less than the prosecutor recommended. These Senators should be required to take many, many hours of remedial civics classes. We don’t need sentencing judges if they are supposed to unquestioningly follow what the prosecutor says. The Senators should know that if judges just do what prosecutors want, a little more of our freedom dies, but apparently that would be consistent with the new conservatism.

The Words Fail

          I have not watched the televised hearings about the nomination of Ketanji Jackson Brown to the Supreme Court and have not deeply immersed myself in the news reports of them, but I gather that there has been a barrage of questions about sentencing for child pornography offenses. The queries have often shown an ignorance or a willful disregard for some basic criminal law principles that the lawyers who have attended elite law schools and clerked for federal judges should know.

          The law draws distinctions among related criminal behaviors to grade the culpability of the crimes and the possible sentences. For instance, I intend to kill Ted and I do kill him. While the wording of statutes is not precisely the same in all jurisdictions, in New York I have committed murder. The legislature has mandated a life sentence for that crime and gives the sentencing judge discretion of a minimum sentence between fifteen and twenty-five years.

          Assume that I intend to kill Josh, but I only wound him. Now I am guilty of attempted murder, which has a lesser sentence than for murder. But what if I do not intend to kill Tom but seriously injure him, and he dies? Although states use different labels for this crime, most places would say I have committed manslaughter, which has a lighter punishment than does murder. If I intended to injure Ted, Josh, and Tom but none dies, I have committed an assault, a crime that also has gradations.

          This all follows a common sense that the public shares. We think intentional killing is more heinous than unintentional killing. This is true for other crimes. We hear “armed robbery” and we think that is worse than other kinds of robberies. The criminal statutes reflect that common sense opinion.

          Child pornography statutes, however, often are different with little attempt to make distinctions among offenses or to grade culpability. This approach does not punish the worst offenders more severely than others.

          When I was a public defender, I did not have any child pornography cases. In those pre-internet days, few arrests were made for the offense. I, however, represented many people charged with drug offenses, and crimes, which we shall see, bear resemblances to child pornography.

          The illegal drug cases were broken down into categories that reflected judgments on the culpability of the offenders. The basic distinction was between sellers and possessors of controlled substances, which reflected the basic common-sense conclusion that drug pushers had committed worse crimes than those who only used the drugs. Sellers deserved, and got, more punishment than mere users.

Furthermore, both the possessor and seller categories had gradations by amounts. The greater the quantity sold, the more serious the offense. If I told a colleague that I had just been assigned a “sale case,” the immediate response invariably was, “How much?” That meant how much was the weight of the drugs allegedly sold. A sale of a kilo of heroin was a much different offense from pushing a few grams.

  The seriousness of possession cases, too, was measured by amounts, but for a different reason. Possessing more drugs was not necessarily worse than possessing a lesser amount if the drugs were to be used by the possessor, but the assumption was that a person possessing a large quantity of drugs was not possessing them solely for personal use. Instead, the possession of a large amount indicated that the person was really a seller. Thus, because he possessed with intent to sell, he should be punished more like a seller than a user. Once again, both the law and popular culture tried to distinguish among the drug offenses.

In state court, I never dealt with another category of drug offenders—the importer, the smuggler, or the manufacturer of a drug. We would simply call the smuggler or the meth cooker a “drug seller,” for they will sell their product, but that label does not suffice to categorize their criminality.  If you believe in our drug laws, the importer’s or manufacturer’s culpability is worse than the “clocker” selling drugs on a street corner. (If you are not familiar with that term, or even if you are, I highly recommend Clockers by Richard Price.) And of course, the culpability becomes worse the greater the amount of drugs made, imported, or sold.

My point is that we almost instinctively make what seem like natural distinctions among drug offenses and do not put the same label on all offenders. We require more information than the mere statement that a person is a drug offender.

This does not mean the gradations perfectly mirror culpabilities. For example, I represented a woman who was a user of drugs and, sadly, a prostitute in what was then a scruffy part of Brooklyn. An undercover police officer “befriended” her and offered her $50 if she would lead him to people who could sell him a kilo of heroin. After much beseeching by him, and after she made some inquiries, she led the cop to some major drug dealers who sold a kilo to the cop. She was charged with acting in concert with the big sellers although all agreed she stood to get only $50 from the transaction. For that she got a life sentence.

The drug gradations may not have been perfect, but it is right, and seemingly natural, that we make such distinctions. We recognize that all the behaviors concerning the drug trade are not equally culpable and should not be lumped together. Our response has been different for child pornography.

(Concluded March 28)