Is Presidential Immunity Necessary?
The Court said that a president must have immunity for official acts because prosecutions can intrude on the authority and functions of the executive branch. Roberts writes:
“The hesitation to execute the duties of his office fearlessly and fairly that might happen when a President is making decisions under a pall of potential prosecution raises unique risks to the effective functioning of government. A President inclined to take one course of action based on the public interest may instead opt for another, apprehensive that criminal penalties may befall him upon his departure from office. And if a former President’s official acts are routinely subjected to scrutiny in criminal prosecutions, the independence of the Executive Branch may be significantly undermined.”
This rationale is remarkable. Up until this decision, it had been widely assumed that a president could be prosecuted after leaving office. Every president until now, if he thought about it at all, would have assumed that he did not have immunity when an ex-president. Meanwhile, the presidency has been extensively, even exhaustively, studied. Untold volumes of presidential papers have been compiled. Uncounted books and papers about the lives of presidents and their decision making have been published. (More than 16,000 publications about Lincoln alone.) If there have been any instances, much less numerous ones, where a president made a decision based on the possibility of a future prosecution, the Court does not tell us about it. On the other hand, if the threat of prosecution has had a powerful effect on presidents, there should be many historical examples of distorted decision making that resulted.
The Court also voiced its concerns about “routine” prosecutions of former presidents for official acts. Roberts said that the dissents raise fears about “extreme hypotheticals where the president feels empowered to violate federal criminal law. The dissents overlook the more likely prospect of an Executive Branch that cannibalizes itself, with each successive president free to prosecute his predecessors, yet unable to boldly and fearlessly carry out his duties for fear that he may be next. . . . Without immunity such types of prosecutions of ex-Presidents could quickly become routine.”
Of course, this is mere speculation without a historical basis. We have an n of one for such prosecutions. The Court seems to have swallowed the Kool Aid of Trump that his prosecution is fueled by partisanship, and if partisanship controls, we can expect more prosecutions. In any event, the supposed fear that political opponents will prosecute former presidents in the future for partisan reasons has neither history nor logic behind it. As noted above, these are the first prosecutions of a former president in our more than two century existence, even though during that time we have had many fierce, partisan alignments. The immunity advocates may say that the times are now different, but if so, they don’t want to recognize that the times may be different because Trump’s actions have been unprecedented.
There are natural, institutional restraints on the use of criminal charges for normal presidential decisions against former presidents. Most of what a president does—appoint a Secretary of State, prepare a budget, draft a new healthcare bill—is not even arguably criminal and will not lead to any criminal prosecution. Perhaps, however, ordering a drone strike that kills an American citizen claimed to be a terrorist leader in the Mideast or declaring an “emergency” to divert moneys to build a border wall that Congress has refused to fund might be at least arguably criminal. Even if so, successor administrations are highly unlikely to seek indictments for such actions no matter what the partisan climate. Criminal charges against a former president could mean that his successor has restricted his own freedom of action. Someday he may want to do something similar to what a predecessor did, but if he labeled it criminal through a prosecution, he wouldn’t be able to. Sitting presidents almost never want to limit their power. Indicting and trying predecessors for truly presidential acts has not happened and will not happen. The scare tactics about routine prosecutions, not supported by history or logic, are straw dogs.
Can Immunized Official Acts Be Used As Evidence?
The Supreme Court went beyond the creation of immunity for Trump. Roberts stated that the Government (i.e., the DOJ) had inappropriately proposed the use of immunized official acts as evidence in an allowed trial. Here’s an example of what that might mean: Assume that it is determined that Trump’s role in seeking to assemble fake electors is a private action, and he can be prosecuted. He might argue that he was only seeking to ensure election integrity, and anything that might look criminal arose out of good intentions and was not a crime. That contention would be undermined by evidence that he sought to have the Justice Department launch sham investigations into the election. Similar kinds of evidence seeking to show a corrupt intention are used regularly in trials. But the Supreme Court said it can’t be used in the prosecution of an ex-president, stating that using official acts to help prove issues in a prosecution for a private act “threatens to eviscerate the immunity we have recognized.”
They held further that the use of such evidence might distort presidential decision making. This assumption was unsupported. Moreover, it’s highly unlikely. The Court apparently believes that a president, while doing an official act for which he will get immunity, might consider that his action might be used in evidence in a criminal prosecution for a non-immunized act that he is not then doing and that he might never do. Follow that? Neither do I. Who thinks along such convoluted lines? Meanwhile, it is hard to see how presidential choices about corporate taxes, Chinese tariffs, the Affordable Care Act, and the like would ever have evidentiary value in a prosecution that may or may not happen for a private act. Come to think of it, would it be a bad thing if a president thought twice about seeking sham investigations into voter fraud?
The Court also said the evidentiary restriction is necessary because otherwise there will be “a unique risk that the jurors’ deliberations will be prejudiced by their views of the policies and the performance of the president.” Furthermore, “the ordinary trial tools may protect ordinary criminal defendants, but the immunity seeks to protect not the president himself but the institution of the presidency.” Not surprisingly, there are no citations in support of these propositions. Moreover, they ignore an obvious logical flaw. The Court can hide presidential behavior by not allowing evidence of it, but it can’t hide that a previous president is being tried. If the jurors are prejudiced by their views of his polices and performance, they will be prejudiced with or without the evidentiary restriction. Of course, normally this is handled during jury selection and by normal evidence rules as well as judicial admonitions about what evidence to consider and how it is to be used. Unless the Court is going to create more unknown trial procedures, the fact that an ex-president is on trial can’t be kept from the jury. If opinions about an ex-president are prejudicial, the prejudice will be there with or without the evidentiary restriction. However, that restriction will deny the jury important evidence making such a trial less fair.
Did It Matter that Justices Alito and Thomas Did Not Recuse Themselves?
Cries went out that Justices Thomas and Alito should recuse themselves because their wives’ activities produced conflicts of interest. The two, of course, still joined the majority. At first glance, this did not seem to matter since the Court split six to three along ideological and political lines. If Justices Thomas and Alito had not sat, the split would have been four to three with the same result. But that overlooks some important points.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote a concurring opinion that largely agreed with Roberts’s opinion. However, she withheld complete agreement by writing that the attempt to organize alternative electors was a private act, and she saw no plausible argument for barring a prosecution for this conduct. If Thomas and Alito had not sat, there would have been only three votes for remanding for a trial court determination of whether this conduct received immunity. Instead, the Court would have held that that the prosecution could proceed on these grounds.
In addition, she also concluded that the evidentiary restriction created by the Court was wrong. The three dissenting judges also came to the conclusion. The four would have been the majority on this issue if Thomas and Alito had been recused. In short, their failure to recuse mattered.
Who Benefits Most from the Decision?
Trump v. United States (seldom has there been a better name for a Supreme Court case—Trump against the United States) was a major victory for the former president. Because of these rulings and remands back to the lower court, no trial will be held for quite some time, if ever. The normal rule is that appeals are held only after all the trial court proceedings have been completed. The Court held, however, that interlocutory appeals can be taken on the immunity issues. That means whenever the trial court decides about immunity — which will take time to allow for briefing, arguments, consideration, and decision making — an appeal on these issues can be taken immediately, and the trial held in abeyance. Then there will be more briefing, arguments, consideration, and decision making in the Court of Appeals. And then there will be an attempt to take the appeal to the Supreme Court. Don’t hold your breath waiting for a trial’s outcome. If Trump is tried, it may not be for years, and by then the case will be in a bastardized form and far from what the prosecution has alleged.
According to some the decision is also a major victory for the institution of the president, but it is also a limitation on the presidency. The Court has taken away part of what it says is a quintessential executive power—the authority to investigate and prosecute crimes. In giving immunity to a former president, the Court has limited the power of the sitting president to investigate and prosecute. The Court, without any apparent consideration of it, has removed from all presidents the quintessential power of determining whether the prosecution of a former president is in the national interest.
The Court, by leaving many issues open with little or clouded guidance, has arrogated power to the judiciary. What is a “core” official act? Is the immunity for a non-core act absolute or presumptive? If it is presumptive, how, if at all, can the presumption be overcome? What is the line between a private act by a president and an official one? We have no evidence that past presidents ever made decisions concerned about a future prosecution, but after this decision a president may be emboldened to push the boundary on criminal actions because of the newly created immunity. However, because of the many open questions, a president may not be sure about his freedom from prosecution. By Roberts’s analysis they still can’t in all circumstances “boldly and fearlessly” carry out their duties. They must wait until the courts decide these open issues. The decision gave the president extraordinary authority; it also gave the courts potent powers.
Of course, the immunity created for Trump should apply to other presidents. Would you advise Biden to use this new opportunity? For example, Biden could order the FBI or intelligence agencies to surveil Trump and all his advisers or to disrupt communications among them. Or perhaps surveil Justice Thomas to see if, despite disclaimers, he and his wife do talk politics. Biden would be giving such orders to members of the executive branch, and his actions would now have absolute immunity.
Conclusion
Almost fifty years ago, David Frost asked then ex-President Nixon whether the president could do something illegal in certain situations such as against antiwar groups and others if he decides “it’s in the best interests of the country or something.” Nixon famously replied, “Well, when the president does it, that means that it is not illegal.” Nixon was mocked for his answer. The present Supreme Court did not say that all official presidential acts were automatically legal; they said only(?) that the president had immunity for them. But is something criminal if the perpetrator can never by prosecuted for it? The mockery of Nixon should end. And of course, there is now the question of whether Nixon should have had immunity for Watergate. Nixon’s role was to talk with his advisers in the executive branch that set off the chain of events that led to Watergate. Would those conversations now have to be considered core presidential actions for which he had absolute immunity?
Welcome to the new world where, according to the Supreme Court, presidents for the first time, can make decisions boldly and fearlessly because they have immunity from criminal prosecution. Meanwhile, many of us see a new world where presidents are above the law and can commit crimes without accountability.
