Posted on by rjonakait

Bridges and Roads, Ports and Canals.

Trump says that America is being treated unfairly at the Panama Canal and that China is running the canal. These are, of course, two separate issues. China could be running the canal, and the U.S. might still be treated fairly. And the U.S. could be treated unfairly even if China is not running the canal. But whether Trump meant one or the other or both, he has not presented information to back up what he says.

His unfairness claim might mean that Panama is discriminating against the U.S. vessels in charges and service. Or Trump might mean that even though there is no discrimination, the fees are too high for all ships. We, of course, can’t know what solutions are possible until we know what the problem, if any, is. Not surprisingly, other than his assertions, Trump has not explained how we are being screwed. I guess the implication is that if we ran the canal, our ships would pay less, but of course, so far that is only a conjecture. And thus we enter our new foreign policy.

Similarly, the assertion that China is running the canal could mean several things. Trump could be saying that Chinese nationals are manning the locks and piloting the vessels. There appears to be no evidence of that. Perhaps Trump means that the Chinese are telling the Panamanians how to operate the canal. Again, no proof of that. However, non-Trump sources indicate that the Chinese have a significant presence in the ports on both ends of the canal. If that presents issues for the United States, it is much broader than just Panama. The Panamanian ports are part of a widespread, worldwide Chinese foreign policy that has existed for more than a decade.

China has invested in or built many, many infrastructure projects around the world. At first they concentrated on the old Silk Road, but they are now involved in building roads, ports, energy plants, rails, and the like in almost every African country, some European countries (Italy, e.g.), and many Latin American nations, including Panama. Case in point: in the last several months, a new $1.3 billion mega-port, built buy China, was dedicated in Peru.

In China’s global Belt and Road Initiative, state-run Chinese Banks have made huge loans to countries, and Chinese construction companies have won many, perhaps most, of the contracts to do the building. China lends money, and then gets much of it back almost immediately because Chinese companies are hired. And they get more money back in the longer term through loan repayments.

America has no comparable initiative. If the Chinese BRI is a national security concern for us, we have had no response other than larger and larger defense spending. (Our defense budget is larger than the next nine countries [including China’s] combined.) Perhaps our security, and the world’s economy, would be better served if some of the money spent on defense contracting went to constructing bridges and tunnels, dredging harbors and building piers, and laying rails, gravel, and asphalt. We are, however, not likely to have any fundamental reconsideration of our defense spending. There are many more areas of “wokeness” in this country than the ones conservatives use as a punching bag, and defense priorities fall in that category. Neither right nor left are willing to question the defense budget. What a wise person said about one branch of the military in essence applies to all the armed services: “The navy recognizes no criticism as constructive except that which calls for the building of additional ships.”

Trump’s jejune rants about Panama are troubling. The suggestion of using military force to take back the canal is worrisome. Bluster can sometimes lead to unwanted, unplanned action. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s the U.S. anticipated that without the Panama Canal Treaties, guerilla attacks on the canal would multiply. If we seize the canal, won’t such warfare emerge? And seizing the canal does not address the Chinese presence in the port cities. Is Trump suggesting armed force to remove the Chinese from their investments and what they have built? That potential aggression, that act of war should scare everyone.

If, however, Trump would broaden his perspective from the Panama Canal to a coherent American response to the BRI, he would be truly advancing American interests. This is unlikely. The BRI was well underway in his first term, and he ignored it. Nothing indicates that he has thought much about it since. Furthermore, grappling with the Chinese actions could cast doubt on Trump tariff policies. The U.S. has been the chief trading partner of Latin America. That is about to change, if it has not already. Trade between China and Central and South America has multiplied dramatically, and America is destined for second place in trade with our southern neighbors for the long term. The change in trading patterns partly stems from the new Latin American ties China has built with the BRI, which have led to China signing free trade agreements with South American counties. The absence of tariffs has led to more trade for both China and Latin America and has given a greater Chinese presence in the Americas. Meanwhile, our proposed foreign policy will apparently rely on increased worldwide tariffs without the equivalent of the Belt and Road Initiative. Why is Trump or anyone surprised that China’s influence in Latin America is increasing while ours wanes?

Posted on by rjonakait

Panama Redux

The Republicans almost produced a government shutdown again and may have merely postponed it for a few months. As a result, the Speaker of the House may be out in the cold in several weeks and the GOP may then show its fractures even more clearly. While this brouhaha was going on, Trump was talking about seizing the Panama Canal. This all brings to mind my previous post about the Panama Canal treaties, which I have reproduced below.

Knowledgeable people find the roots of the Republican Party’s current dysfunction in the hyperpartisanship practiced by Newt Gingrich when he became Speaker of the House in 1995. Others find tentacles spreading from the Tea Party movement, which emerged in 2009 and brought conspiracy theories into mainstream politics. But seeds were planted twenty years earlier with the now largely forgotten battle over the Panama Canal treaties. In his book, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch: The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right (2008), Adam Clymer explains how the fight over the Panama Canal Treaties helped fuel the rise of the modern Right.

Both treaties were signed in 1977. One treaty gave the United States the right to use force to assure that the canal would remain open to ships of all nations. The second treaty gave Panama control over the canal starting in 2000.

In order to take effect, the treaties not only had to be signed by the leaders of Panama and the United States. They also had to be ratified by appropriate bodies within those countries. After Panama did so in a plebiscite, a political battle ensued in the United States Senate over their ratifications. According to Clymer, this led to the emergence of Richard Viguerie, a founder of modern conservatism, the use of direct-mail marketing, and the rise of single-issue PACs designed to raise money and defeat moderate Republicans.

Although it was President Jimmy Carter who signed the pacts, the negotiations had started under President Nixon. The treaties were thought desirable because they gave America the right to assure the canal’s neutrality, and they removed a flashpoint for much of Latin America, and Panama in particular, by giving Panama control over the canal. Those supporting the treaties maintained that they would increase the security of the canal by helping to remove the threats of guerrilla attacks, which were almost impossible for America and Panama to prevent. 

The treaties were backed by prominent conservatives, including Henry Kissinger and William Buckley, but they were also attacked by other conservatives in near-hysterical terms. Opponents maintained that this was a surrender of American sovereignty, and furthermore, the military leader of Panama was pro-Communist. Marxists would control the canal and Panama, and the harm to the U.S. as a result would be disastrous.

What is surprising to a modern surveyor of the political scene is that some Senators supported the treaty simply because they thought it was the right thing to do even though they knew that their ratification votes would harm them politically. The single-issue PACs targeted some of these Senators, and, through direct-mail marketing (enter Richard Viguerie), inflamed a cadre of voters. Republicans who supported the treaties were defeated in primaries when they stood for reelection. Their overall record did not matter. Their vote on this one issue doomed their political careers. On the other hand, Ronald Reagan opposed the Treaty, and some, including Bill Buckley, maintained that the treaty controversy helped elect Reagan president.

This issue is now largely forgotten even though its aftermath continues to affect the United States. A lesson from the controversy has been absorbed, even if that lesson’s source is not remembered. Republican politicians now fear that if they don’t toe some single-issue lines, a portion of conservatives will target them and defeat them in the primaries. The result is that the politicians cannot develop nuanced positions; compromises are verboten. Instead, the “wrong” stance on individual issues can result in a primary defeat even if the politician accepts the conservative line on other matters. If I don’t completely accept the NRA’s positions, I may be defeated in the primary. If I adopt a moderate stance on abortion, I may be defeated in the primaries. If I have concerns about tax cuts, I may be, in today’s terms, “primaried.” And so on. The result is a lockstep, hard-right conservatism. Back in 1978, some conservative Senators studied a complex situation and decided that a ratification vote for the Panama Canal treaties was in the best interests of the country. What is remembered is not that their position was right, but that some lost their political careers as a result.

History, of course, has shown the proponents to be correct. The Canal functions just fine. Panama is not a hotbed of anti-American Communism. Those who were wrong, however, did not pay a price for their belief; they continued in office. And most of us have forgotten the debate.

In what now seems impossible, Democrats and Republicans joined together to ratify the treaties. Fifty-two Democrats and sixteen Republicans voted for ratification, while ten Democrats and twenty-two Republicans voted against. We have seen little of such bipartisanship since the Panama Canal treaties. On the other hand, since that 1977 controversy we have seen many conservatives benefit even when proved wrong.

The Republican party has been on a forty-year path to its present dysfunction.

Posted on by rjonakait

Remember the Panama Canal Treaties

Knowledgeable people find the roots of the Republican Party’s dysfunction in the hyperpartisanship practiced by Newt Gingrich when he became Speaker of the House in 1995. Others find tentacles spreading from the Tea Party movement which emerged in 2009 and brought conspiracy theories into mainstream politics. But seeds were planted twenty years earlier with the now largely forgotten battle over the Panama Canal treaties, which I learned about when I read Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch: The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right (2008) by Adam Clymer.

Clymer explains how the fight over the Panama Canal Treaties helped fuel the rise of the modern Right. Both treaties were signed in 1977. One treaty gave the United States the right to use force to assure that the canal would remain open to ships of all nations. The second treaty gave Panama control over the canal starting in 2000.

In order to take effect, the treaties not only had to be signed by the leaders of Panama and the United States, they also had to be ratified by appropriate bodies within those countries. After Panama did so in a plebiscite, a political battle ensued in the United States Senate over their ratifications. According to Clymer, this led to the emergence of Richard Viguerie, a founder of modern conservatism, the use of direct-mail marketing, and the rise of single-issue PACs designed to raise money and defeat moderate Republicans.

Although it was President Jimmy Carter who signed the pacts, the negotiations had started under President Nixon. The treaties were thought desirable because they gave America the right to assure the canal’s neutrality, and they removed a flashpoint for much of Latin America, and Panama in particular, by giving Panama control over the canal. Those supporting the treaties maintained that they would increase the security of the canal by helping to remove the threats of guerrilla attacks, which were almost impossible for America and Panama to defend against. 

The treaties were backed by some prominent conservatives, including Henry Kissinger and William Buckley, but they were also attacked by other conservatives in near-hysterical terms. Opponents maintained that this was a surrender of American sovereignty, and furthermore, the military leader of Panama was pro-Communist. Marxists would control the canal and Panama, and the harm to the U.S. as a result would be tremendous.

What is surprising to a modern surveyor of the political scene is that some Senators supported the treaty simply because they thought it was the right thing to do even though they knew that their ratification votes would harm them politically. The single-issue PACs targeted some of these Senators and through direct-mail marketing, inflamed a cadre of voters. Republicans who supported the treaties were defeated in primaries when they stood for reelection. Their overall record did not matter. Their vote on this one issue doomed their political careers. On the other hand, Ronald Reagan opposed the Treaty, and some, including Bill Buckley, maintained that the treaty controversy helped elect Reagan president.

 This is an issue that is now largely forgotten even though its aftermath still affects the United States. A lesson from the controversy has been absorbed, even if that lesson’s source is not remembered. Republican politicians are in fear that if they don’t toe some single-issue lines, a portion of conservatives will target them and defeat them in the primaries. The result is that the politicians cannot develop nuanced positions; compromises are verboten. Instead, the “wrong” stance on individual issues can result in a primary defeat even if the politician accepts the conservative line on other matters. If I don’t completely accept the NRA’s positions, I may be defeated in the primary. If I adopt a moderate stance on abortion, I may be defeated in the primaries. If I have concerns about tax cuts, I may be defeated in the primaries. And so on. The result is a lockstep, hard-right conservatism. Back in 1978, some conservative Senators studied a complex situation and decided that a ratification vote for the Panama Canal treaties was in the best interests of the country. What is remembered is not that their position was right, but that some lost their political careers as a result.

History, of course, has shown them to be right. The Canal functions just fine. Panama is not a hotbed of anti-American Communism. Those who were wrong, however, did not pay a price for their belief. They continued in office. And most of us have forgotten the debate.

In what now seems impossible, Democrats and Republicans joined together to ratify the treaties. Fifty-two Democrats and sixteen Republicans voted for ratification, while ten Democrats and twenty-two Republicans voted against. We have seen little of such bipartisanship since the Panama Canal treaties. On the other hand, since that 1977 controversy we have seen many conservatives benefit even when proved wrong.

The Republican party has been on a forty-year path to its present dysfunction.