Principles and Partisanship

The congressional vote to rescind the president’s declaration of a national emergency at the southern border fascinates. It lines up partisanship against principle and will probably indicate how little principles matter. Although many Republicans claim constitutional ideals that should lead them to vote against the declaration, few will.

On March 1, 2019, I posted an essay about the 1977 controversy over the Panama Canal Treaties. Proponent of the treaties thought them desirable because they gave America the right to ensure the canal’s neutrality while removing a flashpoint for much of Latin America, and Panama in particular, by giving Panama control over the canal.  The treaty advocates maintained that the treaties would increase the security of the canal by helping to remove the threat of guerrilla attacks, which were almost impossible to defend against.

While prominent conservatives, including Henry Kissinger and William Buckley, backed the treaties, other conservatives in near-hysterical terms attacked ratification.  The treaties, they argued, were a surrender of American sovereignty, and furthermore, the military leader of Panama was pro-Communist.  Communists would control the canal and Panama, and the subsequent harm to the US would be incalculable. The anti-treaties conservatives made the vote on the Panama Canal a litmus test for a new conservatism. Senators supporting adoption of the treaties drew the ire of a newly mobilized conservative mass. Some Republican Senators, however, did recognize that the treaties were good for this country and voted to ratify. These principled politicians were not rewarded with profile in courage badges. Instead, almost all those Republicans voting yes paid a price imposed on them by the booboosie conservatives. On the other hand, history has shown that those who opposed the treaties were not only wrong but often quite stupid in their opposition. Even so, the opponents of the treaty often benefited from their opposition.

Although the actual controversy over the Panama Canal Treaties may be largely forgotten (which is not surprising since many in Congress show the most superficial knowledge of our history), the political consequences of the treaties battle have been absorbed into the conservative DNA. Don’t vote your principles if that goes against what the right-wing rabble wants. You may lose your office as the conservatives whip up conservative opposition to you.

Even back in 1977, only a few conservatives could bring themselves to vote for the treaties, either because they were not bright enough to understand it was the right choice or they felt more partisan than principled. Since then Congress has become even more partisan and elected Republican conservatives even less principled so the needed Republican votes against the “national emergency” are not likely to be there. (This is not to suggest that all the Democratic votes against the national emergency are principled. There are many reasons for a vote against the president’s declaration: there is no emergency at the southern border; there is an emergency, but a border wall does not meaningfully address it; the president’s declaration contravenes our constitutional separation of powers. And, of course, partisanship.)

The changed nature of Congress was driven home to me by reading Act of Congress: How America’s Essential Institution Works, and How It Doesn’t by Robert G. Kaiser, published in 2013. The book chronicles the passage of the Dodd-Frank act. In doing so, Kaiser explains how Congress starting in the last third of the twentieth century became increasingly partisan.

Perhaps surprisingly, part of the reason for the partisanship is social. No longer do congresspeople live in Washington. At one time, it was common for Senators and Representatives to move to Washington and raise their families there. That led to socializing across party lines. The demonization of opponents was less likely if the politicians frequently shared bourbon, veal cutlets, or a deck of cards together. But representatives now seldom get to know each other. Instead, conservatives increasingly made “Washington” an epithet. Anyone who spent excessive time there was suspect. Then Congressional rules increased reimbursements for travel to home districts. The Washington work week is now generally three, and at most four, days, and representatives go back “home” nearly every week. With lesser contact across party lines, there was a diminished need for politeness.

The demonization of political opponents also increased as safe seats multiplied. Gerrymandering started in the early 1800s, but it changed in 1982 when California drew House districts across the state to increase Democratic representation. Republicans took the hint and became even more proficient at creating safe seats for their party. Kaiser reports that by 2000, 300 of the 435 House seats were secure, and that number has increased since then. Representatives who do not have to seek votes across party lines or even from the center can indulge their political ideology and demonizing rhetoric without fear of retribution.

The cost of elections also increased and fundraising by politicians is now constant. This not only means less time for legislating, it has also led to an era of permanent campaigning. At one time representatives between elections concentrated on the business of governing. They sought respect from their colleagues because this standing made them more effective legislators. Now, always in campaign mode, our representatives are not as concerned with legislative accomplishments as with media attention, which is often garnered with extreme partisanship. We all, apparently, love a good fight and colorful epithets.

(continued March 25)

Remember the Panama Canal Treaties

The vote in the House of Representatives and the upcoming one in the Senate over President Trump’s emergency declaration so he can reallocate money from authorized defense department spending to congressionally unauthorized spending on a border wall has made me think of a book I read a while back, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch: The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right by Adam Clymer. The book did not get much play as far as I know, but it had some important themes that have stuck with me and resonate in our present political climate

Clymer maintained that the fight over the Panama Canal Treaties helped fuel the rise of the modern Right.  The two treaties were signed in 1977.  One treaty authorized the United States to use force to assure that the canal would remain open to ships of all nations.  The second treaty gave Panama, starting in 2000, control over the canal.

The treaties, of course, had to be ratified, and after Panama did so in a plebiscite, a political battle ensued in the United States Senate, which under our Constitution must approve treaties by a two-thirds majority.  According to Clymer, this battle led to the emergence of Richard Viguerie, a founder of modern conservatism, the use of direct-mail marketing, and the rise of single-issue PACs to raise money to defeat moderate Republicans.

Although it was President Jimmy Carter who signed the treaties, the negotiations had started under President Nixon.  The treaties were thought desirable because they gave America the right to ensure the canal’s neutrality and they removed a flashpoint for much of Latin America, and Panama in particular, by giving Panama control over the canal.  Those supporting the treaties maintained that the treaties would increase the security of the canal by helping to remove the threat of guerrilla attacks, which were almost impossible to defend against.

The treaties were backed by prominent conservatives, including Henry Kissinger and William Buckley, but the treaties were also attacked by other conservatives in near-hysterical terms.  This, they argued, was a surrender of American sovereignty, and furthermore, the military leader of Panama was pro-Communist.  Communists would control the canal and Panama, and the subsequent harm to the US would be incalcuable.

What is surprising and heartening to a surveyor of the contemporary political scene is that some Senators supported the treaty simply because they thought it was right even though they knew that their ratification vote might harm them politically.   The single-issue PACs targeted pro-treaty Republican Senators and, through direct-mail marketing, inflamed a cadre of voters. Some moderate Republicans who supported the treaties were defeated when they stood for reelection or had their political influence dissipated. Robert G. Kaiser, the Washington Post’s Senate correspondent during this period, in his book Act of Congress: How America’s Essential Institution Works, and How It Doesn’t, expresses admiration for Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee, who was a Republican leader in the Senate. Kaiser writes, “Baker had presidential ambitions for 1980 and new conservatives viewed him warily, but nevertheless decided to support the treaties, provided they were modified slightly. This, Baker told me privately, was the right thing to do, though he knew it could cost him dearly in the political arena. In fact it probably ended his career.” Sixty-eight Senators, one more than needed, voted for the treaties.

This issue is now largely forgotten even though its aftermath still affects the United States. A lesson from the controversy has been absorbed, even if that lesson’s source is not remembered.  Republican politicians fear that if they don’t toe some single-issue lines, a portion of conservatives will target them and defeat them in the primaries or otherwise destroy their careers.  The result is that the politicians cannot develop nuanced positions; compromises are verboten.  There must be complete acceptance of the NRA’s positions.  Abortions are absolute evil.  Tax cuts are always essential.  All government spending, except on defense, is bad.

Back in 1978, however, some Senators studied a complex situation and decided that a ratification vote was in the best interests of the country even though their decision would harm them politically.  What is remembered is not that their position was right, but that they were harmed politically. The takeaway message was don’t to try to figure out what is best for the country; take the action that avoid personal political harm.

This history is also striking because the treaty opponents have been proven wrong. The Canal functions just fine. Panama is not a hotbed of anti-American Communism. Those who were wrong, however, did not pay a price for their gross error. They continued in office, and one notable politician benefited handsomely from his opposition. Ronald Reagan opposed the Treaty, and some, including Bill Buckley, maintained that the treaty controversy helped make Reagan president.

Pay a price for being right. Gain from being wrong. Ah, America.

And most of us have forgotten the debate. But it will affect the vote on Trump’s “national emergency.”