What’s on the Docket?

The scariest words this month don’t come on Halloween. They cme on the first Monday of October: “The Supreme Court is back in session.” Be afraid; be very afraid.

The Supreme Court has two quite different dockets. There is the emergency docket, sometimes called the shadow docket, where the Court acts quickly without full briefing or oral argument. Then, without giving an opinion, it determines whether some sort of temporary (i.e., emergency) action should be taken.

Then there is the docket often called the merits docket, the one I will focus on here. These cases have written arguments by the litigants (briefs) followed by oral arguments and written opinions explaining the decisions of the Justices. Cases on the merits come before the Supreme Court when four Justices of the Court agree to hear them.  A writ of certiorari (which, I believe, is Latin for “Bring it on”) is granted. More colloquially, the Court grants “cert.” Right now 30 cases have been granted cert.  This is less than half of the cases usually decided in a term, so the Court will continue to add cases in the coming months. Oral arguments for cases on the merits docket started this week.

Many of the cases now docketed are technical in nature and will garner little attention from most of us. Several cases, however, are potentially noteworthy and of general interest. One of those cases asks whether there a Second Amendment right to possess an AR-15 or a similar semiautomatic weapon? These guns are sometimes called assault rifles.

Several cases will consider whether religious freedom is being infringed, including whether local land use regulations can prevent the construction of a religious structure on property that a religious institution owns. Another religion case involves the provision by Colorado of money to both public and private (including religious) pre-K schools, but only if those schools do not discriminate on sexual and gender identity grounds. The defendant (a Catholic Church) is asking the court to force Colorado to carve out an exemption for it so it can continue to discriminate on these grounds and still get the taxpayer money. The Church is arguing that it is religious discrimination against the Church if such an exemption is not granted.

The Court will hear several immigration cases. One deals with immigrants who have been granted asylum status but whose asylum was later terminated. Can they still become lawful permanent residents or are they categorially barred from permanent status? Another immigration case asks under what circumstances, if any, may the government deport people to countries where they have no contacts or ties? A third case: When, if ever, does the government have to give a bail or bond hearing to a detained undocumented immigrant?

The list goes on.

An important parental rights case: Can parents challenge a state law that displaces parental determinations on “gender transitions”?

Voting. Does federal law prevent Arizona from requiring “satisfactory evidence” of citizenship to register to vote and whether federal law prevents Arizona from purging noncitizens from registrations within 90 days of an election?

The case, however, with the widest potential impact is Suncor Energy v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, which was argued this week. Colorado localities have sued the oil companies Suncor and Exxon Mobil under state law for the harm greenhouse gas emissions have caused to the global climate. Suncor is arguing that federal law and the Constitution prevent this use of state law. At first glance, this seems like a normal contention that comes up often, i.e., When does federal law preempt state law? But in the usual preemption situation, there is a federal law that contradicts, or conflicts, or is inconsistent with a state law, and the question is whether under such circumstances the state law can still be enforced. This case, however, is different. There is no specific federal law that is at odds with what Boulder is doing. Instead, Suncor’s novel argument goes along these lines: Since greenhouse gas emissions cross interstate and international boundaries, a state can act against the oil companies only if Congress has affirmatively authorized state action since the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. That concept is new.

A decision on the merits, of course, will greatly affect oil companies. There are fifty or more suits around the country similar to the Colorado one. The companies argue that billions upon billions of dollars are at stake, and the companies could be bankrupted because of such suits.

Something more general is also at stake. If the Court accepts that the states cannot act because Congress has not authorized state action, this decision will mean that other companies will begin to look for similar situations where states, lacking specific congressional authorization, are prohibited from acting. In other words, what other circumstances would be like climate where states cannot act?

However, there are also technical jurisdictional issues in this case. Normally, the Supreme Court does not decide a case until that litigation has had a final determination in the lower court. That is not the situation here. Although the case has gone on for years, it some ways it is just at the beginning. The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled only that the suit can proceed to its next stage. It has not, in fact, been fully litigated in the lower court. The U.S. Supreme Court case might be decided on the procedural issues and not the merits.

And there is another kicker here. In a rare move for the Court, Justice Samuel Alito has recused himself from this case. No reason is given, but it is assumed it is because he owns oil company stocks, and all oil companies will be affected by the outcome.

It’s going to be an interesting term. Boo!

ACB Told Us So

          A week ago, Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett in a speech urged those who are concerned about the Supreme Court to consider more than a case’s outcome. “It’s not just the result that matters. You can disagree with the result passionately. No judge is deciding a case in order to impose a policy result. They are trying to make their best effort to determine what the law requires.” She instructed her audience to the live-streamed event, “Read the opinion,” and asked, “Does [the decision] read like something that was purely results driven and designed to impose the policy preferences of the majority, or does this read like it actually is an honest effort and persuasive effort, even if one you ultimately don’t agree with, to determine what the Constitution and precedent requires?”

          I am one of those who has sleepless nights and troubled naps worrying about the policy decisions made by Barrett and her colleagues. I am hardly alone. A recent poll found that only one in six Americans thinks that the Court is impartial. How could I be so wrong? How could most of you be so wrong? But I can now rest assured. “No judge is deciding a case in order to impose a policy result.” The truth has been delivered. Each and every judge is unbiased. How do I know? Amy Coney Barrett has told me so. Apparently, assertion equals truth.

          It is not surprising that Barrett is especially sensitive to criticisms that her decisions are partisan. She ascended to the Court through blatant partisan maneuverings of Mitch McConnell, and of course, President Trump appointed her because he and others believed that her decisions in certain areas would be predictable. It was expected that she would favor corporations and businesses; aid to religious schools; free exercise of religion claims that would exempt the “religious” from the legal obligations that the rest of us must observe; the limitation or elimination of abortion, contraception, and sexual rights; and the expansion of gun rights.

          The setting of her speech—the Ronald Reagan Library—may have seemed partisan, but the Library over the years has invited all the justices to keynote events. On the other hand, I did not see a non-white face in the audience. That does not mean there was no diversity. Before Barrett spoke, some notables were introduced and that showed that there were white males in attendance from several different boardrooms. Ah, diversity. (These gentlemen are likely to be happy with a current Court trend. Adam Cohen in Supreme Inequality: The Supreme Court’s Fifty-Year Battle for a More Unjust America (2020) notes a study that the Warren Court found in favor of businesses 28% of the time; the Burger Court 48% of the time; 54% for the Rehnquist Court; and 64% for the Roberts Court. Cohen also reports that Justice Scalia voted for criminal defendants in non-white-collar crimes 7% of the time, but in white collar crimes 82% of the time and that Chief Justice Rehnquist voted for defendants in non-white-collar crimes 8% of the times but in white collar crimes 62% of the time.)

          Barrett insists that it is not just the result that matters. Perhaps she is right, but if so, only barely. For most of us, the outcome is what we care about, not how the decision is reached. See post of April 4, 202: Search Results for “Originalism?” – AJ’s Dad (ajsdad.blog). But in trying to reassure us that the results come not from the justice’s personal preferences, Justice Barrett said something troubling. She urged reading the opinion and asked if it reads “like something that was purely results driven.” Purely! I should be sanguine if it is only 80% or 23% results driven? She goes on and asks us if a Justice’s opinion reads as if “designed to impose the policy preferences of the majority, or does this read like it actually is an honest effort and persuasive effort, even if one you ultimately don’t agree with, to determine what the Constitution and precedent requires?” If it reads as that honest effort, I should stop my negative thinking.

          Lawyers are results driven. An attorney is supposed to find a compelling legal path to the outcome the client wants. The lawyer is trying to present a persuasive effort that the client’s desired result is what the Constitution, precedent, or statute requires. I would like to think the Supreme Court Justices would at least make adequate attorneys, and it would be shocking if they could not make apparently good arguments to justify their decisions even if they were results driven. (Barrett, however, did not have much of a career as an attorney; it lasted only a couple years.)

          Some people are convinced by mere preaching from on high, but others believe–cliché alert–that actions speak louder than words. Opinions justifying results that fit with the perceived policy choices of the justices are unlikely to convince the majority of us who are skeptical about the neutrality of the justices. If Barrett rules to overturn Roe v. Wade, I among many are likely to think it was a predetermined result that stems from her conservative and religious views no matter what “legal” reasoning she gives for the outcome. What might convince us that precedent and the Constitution drive justices’ votes would be decisions in which justices have gone against the preconceptions we have of them. Interestingly and all too tellingly, Barrett in her speech provided no such evidence of such an event.

          Her word is supposed to be good enough, but what do you think when someone tells you how honest or disinterested they are? A Supreme Court Justice telling me how pure in thought and motive all the justices are brings a similar skeptical reaction. Justices would be better off not making such pronouncements. If they are going to make speeches, perhaps they should just tell anecdotes—I might feel better about the Court if I found out, for example, that two of its members have argued about what has been the best heavy metal band—and not make what is really a policy statement about how divorced the justices are from making policy pronouncements.

          Even so, before condemning a decision as results-oriented, there is merit to her injunction to read the opinion first, advice that would be easier to follow if justices were forbidden from writing their opinions in more than double-digit pages, something, I assure you, will not happen. Nevertheless, reading the opinion is a good idea. So I was surprised when two days—I repeat, two days—after Barrett’s speech, the Supreme Court rendered a five-to-four decision with vigorous dissents. The decision, upon the request of Louisiana, other states, and companies in the gas and oil industry, reinstated a Trump-era rule that limited the ability of states to block projects that could pollute waterways. The decision fit my preconception of how the conservatives would rule on an environmental case, but I was taking Barrett to heart and went to read the opinion before coming to any conclusions. Guess what? There was no opinion. This came out of what is known as the “shadow docket” of the Court. The majority did not give reasons for its ruling. “Read the opinion”?!?

          I don’t know if Amy Coney Barrett has a good sense of humor. But I do know that she can be ironic.